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Abstract—This work explores a social learning problem with
agents having nonidentical noise variances and mismatched
beliefs. We consider an N -agent binary hypothesis test in which
each agent sequentially makes a decision based not only on a
private observation, but also on preceding agents’ decisions. In
addition, the agents have their own beliefs instead of the true
prior, and have nonidentical noise variances in the private signal.
We focus on the Bayes risk of the last agent, where preceding
agents are selfish.
We first derive the optimal decision rule by recursive belief
update and conclude, counterintuitively, that beliefs deviating
from the true prior could be optimal in this setting. The effect of
nonidentical noise levels in the two-agent case is also considered
and analytical properties of the optimal belief curves are given.
Next, we consider a predecessor selection problem wherein the
subsequent agent of a certain belief chooses a predecessor from
a set of candidates with varying beliefs. We characterize the
decision region for choosing such a predecessor and argue that a
subsequent agent with beliefs varying from the true prior often
ends up selecting a suboptimal predecessor, indicating the need
for a social planner. Lastly, we discuss an augmented intelligence
design problem that uses a model of human behavior from
cumulative prospect theory and investigate its near-optimality
and suboptimality.
Index Terms—social learning, cascading binary hypothesis test,
cumulative prospect theory, augmented intelligence
I. INTRODUCTION
Team decision-making typically involves individual deci-
sions that are influenced by private observations and the
opinions of the rest of the team. The social learning setting
is one such context where decisions of individual agents
are influenced by preceding agents in the team [3], [4]. We
consider the setting in which individual agents are selfish and
aim to minimize their perceived Bayes risk, according to their
beliefs as reinforced by the decisions of preceding agents.
Social learning, also referred to as observational learning,
has been widely studied and we provide a non-exhaustive
listing of some of the relevant works. Aspects of conformism
and “herding” were studied in [5]–[7], where an incorrect
decision may cascade for the rest of the agents once agents
at the beginning make incorrect decisions. The concept of
herding is a consequence of boundedly informative private
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signals [8]. For example, assume the private signals are
binary and give true or false information, each with positive
probability. It can happen that a couple of the first agents
receive false private signals and thus choose wrong actions.
Then, the effect of these actions on the beliefs of subsequent
agents can be so great as to cause them to ignore their private
signals and follow their predecessors. The private signals are
bounded so that they are not strong enough to overcome the
effect of the wrong actions. Further convergence properties of
actions taken under social learning have been explored under
imperfect information [9]. The notion of sequential social
learning has been generalized to learning from neighbors in
networks [10], and explored in generality [11]. Social learning
has also been explored under quantization of priors [12], and
distributed detection with symmetric fusion [13].
Such social learning problems have also been studied as dis-
tributed inference or learning. The traditional setting assumes
a central fusion node that aggregates all information from dis-
tributed nodes and makes the final decision [14], [15], where
the links between distributed nodes and fusion center could
be rate-limited [16] or imperfect [17]–[19]. It is also common
to consider such learning over networks. The network setting
could be the simplest tandem network (in particular, this is
called serial detection) [20]–[23] and extended to a general
network, in which all nodes can identify the hypothesis by
repeatedly updating local beliefs without complete knowledge
of network connectivity [24]–[26]. Independent works [27]
and [28] propose similar update rules and convergence results
for fixed networks and time-varying networks, respectively. In
[29], binary hypothesis testing in the presence of Gaussian
process noise is studied and minimal expected stopping times
are derived. In [30], the setup where the entire hypotheses
are locally indistinguishable, but globally identifiable by belief
update is considered and convergence rate is provided.
This paper differs from the literature in the sense that
we consider unbounded private signals so that there is no
herding behavior. Unlike typical decision-making cascades
(e.g., [31]) where all agents know the true prior, we assume
agents may have beliefs that do not necessarily match the
true prior. Further, private signal strengths of agents could
be different, i.e., noise variances are not necessarily identical.
Information is only propagated along the chain once so there
is no iterative belief update. We focus largely on the effects of
initial belief and private signal strength. The decision-making
of individual agents is also different in that agents make locally
Bayes-optimal decisions, i.e., decisions that minimize their
individual Bayes risk. This is different from the context of
collectively optimizing the team’s risk [13] or decision-making
that maximizes a personal reward based on the last agent’s
decision [32].
We study cascading binary hypothesis testing (or sequential
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2social learning following the notion of [10]) and characterize
optimal beliefs of agents that minimize the Bayes risk of the
last-acting agent. In general, it counterintuitively turns out
that agents using beliefs that do not match the true prior are
optimal, i.e., each agent has a perceived belief of the prior.
For instance, in the two-agent system with equal noise levels,
the optimal predecessor is one who overweights the belief
for small prior, and underweights when it is large. On the
other hand, the corresponding optimal last agent is one who
behaves in the opposite way to the predecessor. For concise
description, we refer to these two modes of operation as
open-minded and closed-minded, respectively.1 We describe
analytical characteristics of the optimal beliefs and also show
how the nature of such behaviors of agents change when noise
levels differ in the private signals.
We are ultimately interested in the Bayes risk of the last-
acting agent, and thus it is important that the last agent
uses the correct set of preceding agents for the task. To
this end, we consider a team construction problem for such
cascading hypothesis testing, and characterize the criterion
used for predecessor selection. We observe that self-organized
teams may have suboptimal compositions, emphasizing the
importance of a social planner that is aware of the true prior.
We also consider a collaborative decision-making system
with human and AI (Artificial Intelligence or Augmented
Intelligence). A cascading decision-making model captures the
nature of collaboration in human-AI teams with either the AI
system advising the human who makes the final decision or
less typically a human advising an AI system that makes the
final decision [34, p. 56]. Examples of the first kind include
AI-assisted physicians, and of the second kind, human-in-the-
loop AI systems such as crowdsourcing.
Note that in human-AI systems, human actions are affected
by individual perceptions of the underlying context that cannot
be tuned/controlled like machine agents (e.g. sensor nodes).
Cumulative prospect theory [35]–[37] seeks to describe bound-
edly rational human behavior under risk by introducing prob-
ability reweighting functions. Among reweighting functions,
the Prelec reweighting function [38] has significant empirical
support and satisfies a majority of the axioms of prospect
theory. We first show the Prelec model does not capture all
patterns of optimal beliefs of agents in the case of diverse noise
levels. Next we show that a team of suboptimal human-AI
agents could outperform a team of standalone optimal human-
AI agents, if it is well-composed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
describes the cascading binary hypothesis testing problem.
Sec. III proposes a recursive belief update equation that
transforms the cascading hypothesis testing problem into a
single-agent binary hypothesis testing problem. Sec. IV shows
the optimal beliefs that minimize the last agent’s Bayes risk
and Sec. V evaluates them for Gaussian likelihoods. Sec. VI
considers a two-agent team construction problem and Sec. VII
discusses design principles of AI-human collaboration sys-
tems. Sec. VIII concludes.
1As far as we know, these terms were first introduced in [33].
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Fig. 1: A cascading decision making model with N agents.
This cascading decision-making problem with identically
noisy agents was first presented in [1] and in particular two-
agent systems with varying noise levels were investigated in
[2]. This paper integrates and generalizes our previous results,
and also, significantly improves analytic understanding on
optimal beliefs in cascading decision-making. In addition, we
provide a novel interpretation of Prelec-like beliefs in terms
of AI-human collaboration systems.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider an N -agent cascading decision making problem,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. The underlying hypothesis, H ∈ {0, 1},
is a binary signal with prior PH = 0 = p0 and PH = 1 =
1 − p0. There are N agents that sequentially detect the state
in a predetermined order. The nth agent has a private signal
Yn generated according to the likelihood fYn|H , which is not
necessarily identical for all n. Let the decision made by the
nth agent be Ĥn. In addition to the private signal, the nth
agent also observes the decisions made by preceding agents,
{Ĥ1, . . . , Ĥn−1}, to make a decision Ĥn.
However, the nth agent believes the prior probability of
the null hypothesis is qn ∈ (0, 1) as against the true prior
probability p0. We call this the belief of the agent in order to
distinguish it from the prior. Agent n is also aware of her own
likelihood fYn|H that defines her private signal. However, she
also perceives the likelihoods and beliefs of the other agents
to be the same as hers, i.e., she thinks fYj |H = fYn|H , qj = qn
for all j 6= n, even though they could be different and unknown
to her. We assume that the likelihood ratio of each agent is an
increasing function in y,2 i.e., for all agents
Ln(y) :=
fYn|H(y|1)
fYn|H(y|0)
is an increasing function of y.
Several numerical examples are given for private signals
defined with independent additive Gaussian noise. The desired
monotonicity also holds for many non-additive models, such as
exponential distribution with mean H−1, H ∈ R+, binomial
distribution with success probability H ∈ [0, 1], and Poisson
distribution with rate H ∈ R+ are members of such family,
where H could take two values.
2This property is particularly useful in uniformly most powerful (UMP)
tests.
3Our performance analysis focuses on the last agent (N th
agent, Norah) and her decision ĤN . Upon observing her
private signal YN and the (N − 1) preceding decisions,
she determines her decision rule. The relative importance
of correct decisions and errors can be abstracted as a cost
function. For simplicity, we assume correct decisions have zero
cost and use the shorthand notations c10 = c(1, 0) as the cost
for false alarm or Type I error (choosing Ĥ = 1 when H = 0),
and c01 = c(0, 1) as the cost for missed detection or Type II
error (choosing Ĥ = 0 when H = 1). In addition, we assume
that agents have the same costs; they are a team in the sense
of Radner [33]. Then the Bayes risk is
RN = c10p0pĤN |H(1|0) + c01(1− p0)pĤN |H(0|1). (1)
As Ĥn depends on the previous decisions, the computation of
(1) also depends on (Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1), and the Bayes risk can
be expanded as
RN =
∑
ĥ1,...,ĥN−1
c10p0pĤN ,ĤN−1,...,Ĥ1|H(1, ĥN−1, . . . , ĥ1|0)
+ c01(1− p0)pĤN ,ĤN−1,...,Ĥ1|H(0, ĥN−1, . . . , ĥ1|1).
(2)
We determine the optimal set of beliefs of the agents {q∗n}Nn=1
that minimize (2).
In our model, the nth agent minimizes her perceived Bayes
risk, which is the Bayes risk with prior probability p0 replaced
by her belief qn. In other words, for all n = 1, . . . , N , the nth
agent adopts the decision rule that minimizes her perceived
Bayes risk Rn, and her decision is revealed to other agents as
a public signal. The decisions {Ĥ1, . . . , Ĥn−1} of the earlier-
acting agents reveal information about H and thus should be
incorporated into the decision-making process by agent n. As
mentioned earlier, since she believes qn is the true prior, she
aggregates information under the assumption that q1 = q2 =
· · · = qn.
It is important to note that every agent is selfish and rational;
the agents do not adjust their decision rules for Norah’s sake.
The novelty in the model (and hence in the conclusions) comes
from agent n having the limitation of using a private initial
belief qn in place of the true prior probability p0.
A. Prospect Theory
Let us also formally introduce the Prelec reweighting func-
tion from cumulative prospect-theoretic models of human
behavior. It spans a family of open- and closed-minded beliefs
(will be clarified later) and thus the optimal beliefs that emerge
in following sections could be approximated by a function in
the Prelec family.
Definition 1 ( [38]): For α, β > 0, the Prelec reweighting
function w : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is
w(p;α, β) = exp(−β(− log p)α).
The function satisfies several properties such as:
1) w(p;α, β) is strictly increasing;
2) has a unique fixed point w(p;α, β) = p at p∗ =
exp(− exp(log β/(1− α))); and
3) spans a class of open-minded beliefs when α < 1, i.e.,
overweights (underweights) small (high) probability, and
vice versa when α > 1.
A more generic form, termed composite Prelec weighting
function, has been defined in [39].
B. Notations
Throughout the paper, we use f for continuous probability
density functions and p for discrete probability mass functions.
All logarithms are natural logarithms. We use N (µ, σ2) to
denote a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2,
and φ(x;µ, σ2) to denote its density function, i.e.,
φ(x;µ, σ2) =
1√
2piσ2
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 .
Also in the case of the standard Gaussian, φ(x) := φ(x; 0, 1)
for simplicity. Q(x) is defined as the complementary cumula-
tive distribution function of the standard Gaussian,
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
φ(t)dt.
III. BELIEF UPDATE AND SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING
Our model assumes unbounded private signals. Thus, unlike
in [5], [6], it is always possible that a subsequent agent
may not follow previous decisions; that is, herding happens
with arbitrarily low probability. We now discuss using both
a decision history and private signals for Bayesian binary
hypothesis testing. The decision rule can be interpreted as
each agent updating her posterior belief based on the decision
history and then applying a likelihood ratio test to her private
signal.
A. Alexis, the First Agent
Since Alexis has no prior decision history, she follows usual
binary hypothesis testing. She uses the following likelihood
ratio test with her initial belief q1, with ties broken arbitrarily:
L1(y1) =
fY1|H(y1|1)
fY1|H(y1|0)
Ĥ1=1
≷
Ĥ1=0
c10q1
c01(1− q1) . (3)
Since we assume the likelihood ratio is increasing in y1,
the rule simplifies to comparing the private signal with an
appropriate decision threshold:
y1
Ĥ1=1
≷
Ĥ1=0
λ1(q1), (4)
where λi(q) denotes the decision threshold λ that satisfies
Li(λ) =
fYi|H(λ|1)
fYi|H(λ|0)
=
c10q
c01(1− q) . (5)
4B. Blake, the Second Agent
Blake observes Alexis’s decision Ĥ1 = ĥ1 and evaluates
the likelihood ratio for (Ĥ1, Y2), using his initial belief q2 as
fY2,Ĥ1|H(y2, ĥ1|1)
fY2,Ĥ1|H(y2, ĥ1|0)
Ĥ2=1
≷
Ĥ2=0
c10q2
c01(1− q2) . (6)
The private signals Y1 and Y2 are independent conditioned
on H , so Ĥ1 and Y2 are also independent conditioned on H .
Hence, the left side of (6) is
fY2,Ĥ1|H(y2, ĥ1|h) = fY2|H(y2|h)pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h).
So we can rewrite (6) as3
fY2|H(y2|1)
fY2|H(y2|0)
Ĥ2=1
≷
Ĥ2=0
c10q2
c01(1− q2)
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[2]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[2]
. (7)
The likelihood ratio test (7) can be interpreted as Blake
updating his initial belief upon observing Alexis’s decision
Ĥ1. Combined with q2, his initial belief is updated according
to pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h)[2], from q2 to q
ĥ1
2 :
qĥ12
1− qĥ12
=
q2
1− q2
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[2]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[2]
. (8)
The posterior belief is
qĥ12 =
q2pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[2]
q2pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[2] + (1− q2)pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[2]
=
pĤ1,H(ĥ1, 0)[2]
pĤ1,H(ĥ1, 0)[2] + pĤ1,H(ĥ1, 1)[2]
= pH|Ĥ1(0|ĥ1)[2].
(9)
It should be noted that the true pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h) is given by
pĤ1|H(0|h) = pĤ1|H(0|h)[1] = PY1 ≤ λ1(q1)|H = h
=
∫ λ1(q1)
−∞
fY1|H(y|h)dy,
pĤ1|H(1|h) =
∫ ∞
λ1(q1)
fY1|H(y|h)dy.
But Blake evaluates Alexis’s decision Ĥ1 as if it were made
based on q2 and the likelihood fY2|H(·), as against q1, fY1|H(·)
respectively. Thus the probability pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h) is computed
based on λ2(q2), instead of λ1(q2):
pĤ1|H(0|h)[2] =
∫ λ2(q2)
−∞
fY2|H(y|h)dy, (10a)
pĤ1|H(1|h)[2] =
∫ ∞
λ2(q2)
fY2|H(y|h)dy. (10b)
3The subscript [2] in the term p
Ĥ1|H(ĥ1|h)[2] indicates the value of
p
Ĥ1|H(ĥ1|h) that Blake (the second agent) thinks. We specify this because
Blake does not know Alexis’s belief q1. Thus, he interprets her decision
based on his belief q2. The value is different from the true value of
p
Ĥ1|H(ĥ1|h) = pĤ1|H(ĥ1|h)[1]. Of course, it will also be different from
what Chuck, the third agent, perceives, which is denoted by p
Ĥ1|H(ĥ1|h)[3].
This will be explained in the next subsection.
An interesting observation is that Alexis’s belief q1 does not
affect Blake’s belief update as observed in (9) and (10). That is,
for any belief q1 that Alexis might hold, Blake, who does not
know this belief, presumes that the conditional probabilities
are computed according to (10) and updates his belief as in
(9) which depends only on Blake’s initial belief and Alexis’s
decision.
However, Alexis’s initial belief implicitly affects Blake’s
performance since her biased belief changes the resulting
decisions whose probabilities are embedded in the probability
of Blake’s decision:
pĤ2|H(ĥ2|h) =
∑
ĥ1∈{0,1}
pĤ2,Ĥ1|H(ĥ2, ĥ1|h)
= pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|0, h)[2] × pĤ1|H(0|h)[1]
+ pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|1, h)[2] × pĤ1|H(1|h)[1].
Thus, Alexis’s biased belief changes the probability of not
only her decision but also of Blake’s decision.
C. Chuck, the Third Agent
Chuck’s detection process is similar to Blake’s. He observes
both Alexis’s and Blake’s decisions and also updates his initial
belief q3 like in (8):
qĥ1,ĥ23
1− qĥ1,ĥ23
=
q3
1− q3
pĤ2,Ĥ1|H(ĥ2, ĥ1|0)[3]
pĤ2,Ĥ1|H(ĥ2, ĥ1|1)[3]
=
(
q3
1− q3
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[3]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[3]
)
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|ĥ1, 0)[3]
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|ĥ1, 1)[3]
.
(11)
Note that Ĥ1 and Ĥ2 are not conditionally independent given
H as Blake’s decision Ĥ2 depends on Alexis’s decision Ĥ1.
Chuck’s belief update can be understood as a two-step
process. The first step is to update his belief according to
Alexis’s decision:
qĥ13
1− qĥ13
=
q3
1− q3
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[3]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[3]
. (12)
The second step is to update it from qĥ13 based on Blake’s
decision:
qĥ1,ĥ23
1− qĥ1,ĥ23
=
qĥ13
1− qĥ13
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|ĥ1, 0)[3]
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(ĥ2|ĥ1, 1)[3]
. (13)
Again, Chuck is not aware of neither Alexis’s nor Blake’s
initial beliefs or likelihoods. Thus, Chuck computes all proba-
bilities based on his own belief q3 and likelihood fY3|H , which
is indicated by the subscript [3] in (12) and (13).
Details of computations of (12) and (13) are as follows:
pĤ1|H(0|h)[3] =
∫ λ3(q3)
−∞
fY3|H(y|h)dy,
pĤ1|H(1|h)[3] =
∫ ∞
λ3(q3)
fY3|H(y|h)dy.
5Similar to Blake (8), Chuck computes qĥ13 for Ĥ1 = 0 and
Ĥ1 = 1 respectively as:
q03 =
q3
q3 + (1− q3)
∫ λ3(q3)
−∞ fY3|H(y|1)dy∫ λ3(q3)
−∞ fY3|H(y|0)dy
, (14a)
q13 =
q3
q3 + (1− q3)
∫∞
λ3(q3)
fY3|H(y|1)dy∫∞
λ3(q3)
fY3|H(y|0)dy
. (14b)
Then,
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(0|ĥ1, h)[3] =
∫ λ3(qĥ13 )
−∞
fY3|H(y|h)dy, (15a)
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(1|ĥ1, h)[3] =
∫ ∞
λ3(q
ĥ1
3 )
fY3|H(y|h)dy. (15b)
Even though the value of ĥ1 does not appear in (15), it is
implicit in qĥ13 and affects the computation results. Chuck’s
posterior belief qĥ1,ĥ23 is obtained by substituting (14) and
(15) in (13).
D. Norah, the N th Agent
Norah, the N th agent, observes YN and {Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1}.
Paralleling the arguments in the preceding subsections,
her initial belief update is a function of qN as well as
{Ĥ1, . . . , ĤN−1}, but not of {q1, . . . , qN−1}. Generalizing
(11), we have
q
ĥ1,...ĥN−1
N
1− qĥ1,...ĥN−1N
=
qN
1− qN
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)[N ]
pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)[N ]
×
N−1∏
n=2
pĤn|Ĥn−1,...,Ĥ1,H(ĥn|ĥn−1, . . . , ĥ1, 0)[N ]
pĤn|Ĥn−1,...,Ĥ1,H(ĥn|ĥn−1, . . . , ĥ1, 1)[N ]
.
(16)
Combining all observations, we obtain the following theo-
rem. Define the initial belief update function for N th agent,
UN as
q
ĥ1...ĥN−1
N = UN (qN , ĥ1, ĥ2, . . . , ĥN−1;N).
Theorem 1: The function Un, n ≤ N yielding the posterior
belief of N th agent has the following recurrence relation:
• For n = 1, U1(q;N) = q.
• For n > 1,
Un(q, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2, 0;N)
=
q˜
q˜ + (1− q˜)
∫ λN (q˜)
−∞ fYN |H(y|1)dy∫ λN (q˜)
−∞ fYN |H(y|0)dy
, (17a)
Un(q,N, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2, 1;N)
=
q˜
q˜ + (1− q˜)
∫∞
λN (q˜)
fYN |H(y|1)dy∫∞
λN (q˜)
fYN |H(y|0)dy
, (17b)
where q˜ = Un−1(q, ĥ1, . . . , ĥn−2;N).
Note that capital N in (17a) and (17b) indicate the recursive
updates are computed from the value that the N th agent thinks.
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Fig. 2: The function U4(q4, ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3; 4)—posterior belief of
the fourth agent (qĥ1,ĥ2,ĥ34 )—for each possible combination
of Alexis’s, Blake’s, and Chuck’s decisions [ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3] when
c10 = c01 = 1 and private signals are distorted by additive
Gaussian noise with two noise levels. The posterior belief is
mostly dependent on Chuck’s decision; the top four curves are
for ĥ3 = 0 and the bottom four curves are for ĥ3 = 1.
Fig. 2 depicts the function U4(q4, ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3; 4) for N = 4
for eight possible combinations of Alexis’s, Blake’s, and
Chuck’s decisions (ĥ1, ĥ2, ĥ3). An interesting property of
UN is that the posterior belief is much more dependent on
the most recent decision ĥN−1 than on the earlier decisions
(ĥ1, . . . , ĥN−2). This is because later acting agents consider
more previous decisions, and hence more information than the
first agents, their decisions should carry more weight. In this
sense, we can say that recent decisions give more information
than earlier decisions. This is especially the case when the
(N − 1)th agent has not followed precedent. This is because
the N th agent rationally concludes that the (N − 1)th agent
observed strong evidence to justify a deviation from precedent.
6For example, if the decision history of the first five agents
is (0, 0, 0, 0, 1) then the sixth agent takes the last decision 1
seriously even though the first four agents chose 0. A reversal
of an arbitrarily long precedent sequence may occur because
we assume unbounded private signals; if private signals are
bounded [5], [6], then the influence of the precedent can reach
a point where agents cannot receive a signal strong enough
to justify a decision running counter to precedent. Another
interesting point is that smaller noise variance changes beliefs
more. It is clear from (17), but also reasonable that when the
variance is smaller, the N th agent trusts and is more inclined
towards previous decisions. Note even though the prior updates
of Norah in Fig. 2 do not depend on {q1, . . . , qN−1} and their
corresponding likelihoods, the probability of prior decisions
depends on them and implicitly, so does Norah’s decision.
As we can see in Fig. 2, the dominant previous decision for
agent N is the decision of agent (N − 1). We can prove that
observing the (N − 1)th agent’s decision 0 (or decision 1),
the N th agent’s posterior belief becomes larger (or smaller),
which in turn implies that the decision threshold of N th agent
becomes larger (or smaller) so that she is more likely to declare
decision 0 (or 1) as well.
Theorem 2: Suppose that noises are independent and addi-
tive, and have continuous densities. Fix some prior decisions
{ĥ1, . . . , ĥN−2} and let q˜N , q˜0N , q˜1N denote the posterior be-
liefs of the N th agent given the (N − 2) decisions only, the
(N − 2) decisions with ĥN−1 = 0, and the (N − 2) decisions
with ĥN−1 = 1. Then,
q˜1N < q˜N < q˜
0
N .
Proof: We know that q˜N , q˜0N , q˜
1
N differ only by the last
multiplicative term of (16). Since q1−q is monotone increasing,
the statement is equivalent to showing:∫∞
λN (q˜N )
fYN |H(y|0)dy∫∞
λN (q˜N )
fYN |H(y|1)dy
< 1 <
∫ λN (q˜N )
−∞ fYN |H(y|0)dy∫ λN (q˜N )
−∞ fYN |H(y|1)dy
.
Since the noise is independent and additive, fYN |H(y|1) =
fYN |H(y − 1|0) so the term on the left side∫∞
λN (q˜N )
fYN |H(y|0)dy∫∞
λN (q˜N )
fYN |H(y|1)dy
=
∫∞
λn(q˜N )
fYN |H(y|0)dy∫∞
λN (q˜N )−1 fYN |H(y|0)dy
=
∫∞
λN (q˜N )
fYN |H(y|0)dy∫ λN (q˜N )
λN (q˜N )−1 fYN |H(y|0)dy +
∫∞
λN (q˜N )
fYN |H(y|0)dy
< 1.
The right inequality can be shown similarly.
Considering the complicated relationships that individual
decisions have on the evolution of initial beliefs, it is also im-
portant to verify if the belief evolution preserves the ordering,
given the same set of subsequent decisions. That is, given two
beliefs qL < qR at some point of the recursive update and the
same sequence of following d decisions, then it is important
to characterize the likelihoods for which the the ordering is
preserved in the resulting posterior beliefs, given the sequence
of decisions, which is described in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: Suppose that noise is independent and additive,
and has a continuous density. Consider two beliefs qL < qR.
Then, for any given later-acting decisions d, the posterior
belief satisfies qdL < q
d
R if and only if
g1(q) :=
q
1− q
∫ λN (q)
−∞ fYN |H(y|0)dy∫ λN (q)
−∞ fYN |H(y|1)dy
, (18)
g2(q) :=
q
1− q
∫∞
λN (q)
fYN |H(y|0)dy∫∞
λN (q)
fYN |H(y|1)dy
(19)
are both increasing in q.
Proof: Note that once observing decision 0, beliefs are
updated as
q0L
1− q0L
=
qL
1− qL
∫ λN (qL)
−∞ fYN |H(y|0)dy∫ λN (qL)
−∞ fYN |H(y|1)dy
,
q0R
1− q0R
=
qR
1− qR
∫ λN (qR)
−∞ fYN |H(y|0)dy∫ λN (qR)
−∞ fYN |H(y|1)dy
,
and so if (18) holds, q0L < q
0
R. Similarly, (19) can be shown
by updating after decision 1.
Let us state some properties of Mills ratio [40], [41],
which is about Gaussian distribution, and we will see that
g1(q), g2(q) are both increasing if likelihood is Gaussian.
Lemma 1 ( [41]): Define η(x) := φ(x)/Q(x), the inverse of
Mills ratio. Then, for any x ∈ R, it is true that 0 < η′(x) < 1
and η′′(x) > 0.
Corollary 1: Consider a Gaussian likelihood, i.e., YN =
H + ZN , where ZN are independent and identically drawn
from N (0, σ2), for some σ2 > 0. Then g1(q), g2(q) are both
increasing in q.
Proof: Let us consider g2(q) first. For the binary hy-
pothesis test with Gaussian noise, we know that the decision
threshold for the likelihood ratio test is given by
λN (q) =
1
2
+ σ2 log
(
c10q
c01(1− q)
)
.
Then, we have
g2(q) =
q
1− q
Q
(
λN (q)
σ
)
Q
(
λN (q)−1
σ
) .
Letting x := log c10qc01(1−q) , it is sufficient to show that
g˜(x) := log
(
c10
c01
g2(q)
)
= x+ log
(
Q
(
σx+ 12σ
))− log (Q (σx− 12σ )) ,
is increasing in x since c10, c01 are positive constants, log(·)
is a monotonically increasing function, and x is a strictly
increasing function of q.
The first derivative of g˜ is given by
g˜′(x) = 1− ση (σx+ 12σ )+ ση (σx− 12σ ) . (20)
Since η(·) is a continuous function, using the mean value
theorem, there exists y ∈ (σx− 12σ , σx+ 12σ ), such that
ση
(
σx+ 12σ
)− ση (σx− 12σ ) = ση′(y) 1σ = η′(y). (21)
7From the first property of Lem. 1, 0 < η′(y) < 1, we have
η
(
σx+ 12σ
)− η (σx− 12σ ) < 1.
Thus, from (20), it follows that g˜′(x) > 0 for all x, indicating
that g˜(·) is an increasing function of x. This in turn implies
that g2(·) is also an increasing function.
To prove the result for g1, it is sufficient to observe that by
the symmetry of error probabilities:
g1(q) =
1
g2(1− q) .
IV. OPTIMAL BELIEF
We described the initial belief evolution and decision-
making model in Sec. III. In this section, we investigate the
set of initial beliefs that minimize the Bayes risk. We consider
the case of two agents for analytical tractability although the
broad nature of the arguments extend to multi-agent systems.
Note that the Bayes risk of the system with N = 2 is the same
as Blake’s Bayes risk because his decision is adopted as the
final decision.
Let us recapitulate the computation of Blake’s Bayes risk.
Alexis chooses her decision threshold as λ1 := λ1(q1). Her
probabilities of error are given by
P Ie,1 = pĤ1|H(1|0) =
∫ ∞
λ1
fY1|H(y|0)dy,
P IIe,1 = pĤ1|H(0|1) =
∫ λ1
−∞
fY1|H(y|1)dy.
Blake however presumes Alexis uses the decision threshold
λ1,[2] := λ2(q2) and computes her probabilities of error
accordingly4:
P Ie,1,[2] = pĤ1|H(1|0)[2] =
∫ ∞
λ1,[2]
fY2|H(y|0)dy,
P IIe,1,[2] = pĤ1|H(0|1)[2] =
∫ λ1,[2]
−∞
fY2|H(y|1)dy.
When Alexis decides Ĥ1 = 0, Blake updates his belief q2
to the posterior q02 :
q02
1− q02
=
q2
1− q2
1− P Ie,1,[2]
P IIe,1,[2]
=⇒ q02 =
q2(1− P Ie,1,[2])
q2(1− P Ie,1,[2]) + (1− q2)P IIe,1,[2]
,
(22)
his decision threshold is λ02 := λ2(q
0
2), and the probabilities
of error are
P I0e,2 = pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(1|0, 0) =
∫ ∞
λ02
fY2|H(y|0)dy,
P II0e,2 = pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(0|0, 1) =
∫ λ02
−∞
fY2|H(y|1)dy.
4Recall that the subscript [2] denotes the quantity ‘seen by’ Blake.
Likewise, when Alexis decides Ĥ1 = 1, Blake updates his
belief q2 to the posterior q12 :
q12
1− q12
=
q2
1− q2
P Ie,1,[2]
1− P IIe,1,[2]
=⇒ q12 =
q2P
I
e,1,[2]
q2P Ie,1,[2] + (1− q2)(1− P IIe,1,[2])
,
(23)
his decision threshold is λ12 := λ2(q
1
2), and the probabilities
of error are
P I1e,2 = pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(1|1, 0) =
∫ ∞
λ12
fY2|H(y|0)dy,
P II1e,2 = pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(0|1, 1) =
∫ λ12
−∞
fY2|H(y|1)dy.
Now we compute the system’s Bayes risk (or Blake’s Bayes
risk) R2:
R2 = c10pĤ2,H(1, 0) + c01pĤ2,H(0, 1)
= c10
∑
ĥ1∈{0,1}
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(1|ĥ1, 0)pĤ1|H(ĥ1|0)pH(0)
+ c01
∑
ĥ1∈{0,1}
pĤ2|Ĥ1,H(0|ĥ1, 1)pĤ1|H(ĥ1|1)pH(1)
= c10
[
P I0e,2(1− P Ie,1) + P I1e,2P Ie,1
]
p0
+ c01
[
P II0e,2P
II
e,1 + P
II1
e,2(1− P IIe,1)
]
(1− p0). (24)
Note that the Bayes risk R2 in (24) is a function of q1 and
q2. One might think that R2 is minimum at q1 = q2 = p0 as
Alexis makes the best decision for the true prior and Blake
does not misunderstand her decision. Surprisingly, however,
this turns out to not be true. We prove this by studying Alexis’s
optimal belief q∗1 that minimizes R2.
Theorem 4: Alexis’s and Blake’s optimal beliefs q∗1 , q
∗
2 that
minimize R2 satisfy
q∗1
1− q∗1
=
p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)
(1− p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2)
. (25)
Before proceeding to the proof, note that error probability
terms in the right-side are dependent on q2, but not on q1.
Furthermore, the value of (P I1e,2 − P I0e,2)/(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2) is
generally not 1, i.e., in general q1 = q2 = p0 is not the
optimal belief. For example, for the additive Gaussian noise
model considered in the next section, the ratio is not equal to
1 except when p0 = c01/(c10 + c01).
Proof of Thm. 4: Let us consider the first derivative of
(24) with respect to q1:
∂R2
∂q1
= c10p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)
∂P Ie,1
∂q1
+ c01(1− p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2)
∂P IIe,1
∂q1
.
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Fig. 3: The Bayes risk for q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1) with p0 = 0.3,
c10 = c01 = 1, and additive standard Gaussian noise. The pair
of optimal beliefs (N) yields R2 = 0.2186, while the true prior
(•) yields R2 = 0.2214.
We want to find q1 that minimizes R2, i.e., q1 makes the first
derivative zero. Using
dP Ie,1
dq1
=
dP Ie,1
dλ1
dλ1
dq1
= −fY1|H(λ1|0)
dλ1
dq1
,
dP IIe,1
dq1
=
dP IIe,1
dλ1
dλ1
dq1
= fY1|H(λ1|1)
dλ1
dq1
;
this occurs when
c10p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)fY1|H(λ1|0)
= c01(1− p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2)fY1|H(λ1|1)
⇐⇒ fY1|H(λ1|1)
fY1|H(λ1|0)
=
c10p0(P
I1
e,2 − P I0e,2)
c01(1− p0)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2)
. (26)
Note that λ1 = λ1(q1) is the solution to (4),
fY1|H(λ1|1)
fY1|H(λ1|0)
=
c10q1
c01(1− q1) . (27)
Equating (26) and (27) completes the proof.
The theorem considers general continuous likelihoods
{fYn|H} with the monotonicity assumption on λ(q). It is inter-
esting to evaluate the optimal beliefs in the case of Gaussian
likelihoods (i.e., additive Gaussian noise) and obtain insights
into optimality in the sequential decision-making problem.
V. GAUSSIAN LIKELIHOODS
We now focus on Gaussian likelihoods and study their
optimal beliefs in this section. Suppose the nth agent receives
the signal Yn = H+Zn, where Zn is an independent additive
Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2n > 0. Thus,
the received signal probability densities for H = h are
fYn|H(yn|h) = φ(yn;h, σ2n).
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Fig. 4: The trend of the optimal beliefs for N = 2 (Alexis,
Blake). Z1, Z2 are standard Gaussian.
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Fig. 5: The trend of the optimal beliefs for N = 3 (Alexis,
Blake, and Chuck). Z1, Z2, Z3 are standard Gaussian.
For a belief qn, the decision threshold is then determined by
the likelihood ratio test,
Ln(yn) =
fYn|H(yn|1)
fYn|H(yn|0)
Ĥ1=1
≷
Ĥ1=0
c10qn
c01(1− qn) ,
that simplifies to the following simple threshold condition for
Gaussian likelihoods:
yn
Ĥ1=1
≷
Ĥ1=0
λn(qn) =
1
2
+ σ2n log
(
c10qn
c01(1− qn)
)
. (28)
Here the index n represents the nth agent in the system, as
the belief and variance of the agent varies along the chain.
Using the recursive update in Sec. III and decision threshold
(28), it is possible to obtain the Bayes risk of Blake (i.e.,
N = 2) for given beliefs q1, q2. Fig. 3 depicts Blake’s Bayes
risk for q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1), and explicitly shows that knowing true
prior probability is not optimal. The social learning problem
with Bayes costs c10 = c01 = 1, prior p0 = 0.3, and additive
Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance results in a
Bayes risk that is minimum when Alexis’s belief is 0.38 and
Blake’s belief is 0.23, shown in the figure (triangle) and is
compared to the true prior (circle).
Figs. 4 and 5 show the trend of optimal belief pair that
minimizes the last agent’s Bayes risk, when all agents have
the same noise levels for the case of two and three agents
respectively. We can observe several common characteristics.
First, the non-terminal agents (i.e., Alexis for N = 2 and
Alexis and Blake for N = 3) overweight their beliefs if p0
is small and underweight it if p0 is large. We call this open-
minded behavior as it enhances less likely events. Second,
the last agent (i.e., Blake for N = 2 and Chuck for N =
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3) underweights the belief if p0 is small and overweights it
if p0 is large, implicitly compensating for the biases of the
preceding agents. Such behavior is referred to as being closed-
minded as it represents a cautious outlook to the decision-
making problem. Lastly, there is a unique, non-trivial prior,
p0 ∈ (0, 1), where all agents’ optimal beliefs are identical to
the true prior.
However, the case of nonidentical noise variances of agents
results in a very different behavior of optimal beliefs, es-
pecially when the last agent has smaller noise. The optimal
beliefs for N = 2 and the case of the preceding agent having
smaller noise, and that of the last agent having smaller noise
respectively are shown in Figs. 6 and 7. As can be observed,
the optimal belief curves are markedly different when the last
agent has smaller noise, and we now derive some analytical
properties of q∗1 , q
∗
2 .
Theorem 5: For any σ21 and σ
2
2 , q
∗
1 and q
∗
2 satisfy:
1) for p0 ∈ (0, 1), q∗1 ≤ p0 if and only if q∗2 ≥ c01c01+c10 ,
with equality for q∗2 =
c01
c01+c10
.
2) p0 = q∗1 = q
∗
2 if and only if p0 ∈
{
0, c01c01+c10 , 1
}
.
Proof: Given in App. A.
Thm. 5 highlights the fact that if the last agent believes
the null hypothesis is more likely, then the ideal predecessor
underweights the prior, and vice versa. Additionally, for p0
near zero (near one) the optimal predecessor overweights
(underweights) the prior.
In particular, let us consider two cases separately. First,
let the predecessor have smaller noise. Then the curves for
optimal beliefs and the corresponding Bayes risk are as shown
in Fig. 6. The behavior here is similar to the case with equal
noise, indicating that the reducing noise of the predecessor
does not alter the overall behaviors of beliefs, as the last agent
is unaware of this improved signal quality.
On the other hand, when the last agent has smaller noise,
we notice that the nature of curves changes, as shown in
Fig. 7. The behavior of the ideal agents indicates that when
the predecessor has significantly larger noise than the last
agent, the last agent stays open-minded. In addition, q∗1 has
multiple crossings with p0, but q∗2 has a single crossing at
q∗2 = c01/(c01 + c10).
As expected, the ideal predecessor is open-minded for near-
deterministic priors (p0 close to zero or one). However, when
the prior uncertainty in the hypotheses is high (p0 near 1/2),
we note that the ideal last agent with less noise favors the less
likely hypothesis. This can be attributed to the fact that the last
agent stays open-minded to the less likely hypothesis when the
predecessor with larger noise is more likely to make errors.
To further understand the nature of such an predecessor, we
characterize the crossings of the optimal belief curve with the
prior q∗1 = p0 .
Theorem 6: The set of all p0 such that q∗1 = p0, q
∗
2 =
c01
c01+c10
is given by the solutions to
ex =
1− βQ(−α+ σ1x)
1− βQ(−α− σ1x) , (29)
where
x = log
(
c10p0
c01(1− p0)
)
, α =
1
2σ1
, β = 1− Q (1/2σ2)
Q (−1/2σ2) .
Proof: Given in App. B.
We note that p∗ = c01c01+c10 is always a solution to (29). The
case of multiple solutions to (29) is of particular interest and
a sufficient condition is given in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: If
2βσ1φ(α)
1− βQ(−α) > 1, (30)
then, (29) has at least 3 solutions in (0, 1).
Proof: Since x is a monotonic function of p0, it is
sufficient to show that (29) has at least 3 solutions in x. From
the symmetry in (29), since x = 0 is always a root, it suffices
to show the existence of at least one more root in x > 0. First
note the ranges of variables, x ∈ (−∞,∞), α ∈ (0,∞), β ∈
(0, 1).
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The red dotted contour shows the contour that results in 1 so
that the area below it satisfies (30) and therefore has multiple
solutions to (29).
Letting r(x) be the right side of (29), since 0 ≤ Q(·) ≤ 1,
we have
1− β ≤ r(x) := 1− βQ(−α+ σ1x)
1− βQ(−α− σ1x) ≤
1
1− β ,
indicating that r(x) ∈ [1 − β, 11−β ]. However, note that ex
monotonically increases in (1,∞) for x > 0. Since ex, r(x)
coincide at x = 0, it follows that they cross at least once on
(0,∞) and also on (−∞, 0), if r′(x) > ddxex at x = 0 by
the intermediate value theorem. Thus, the sufficient condition
follows:
r′(0) =
2σ1βφ(α; 0, 1)
1− βQ(−α) > 1 =
d
dx
ex
∣∣∣∣∣
x=0
.
Cor. 2 provides a sufficient condition on the noise level
of agents under which there exists multiple crossings of the
curves q∗1(p0) and p0. The range of standard deviations of the
additive Gaussian noise of the preceding and last agents that
satisfy the sufficient condition of Cor. 2 is shown in Fig. 8.
Note from the figure that the area below the red dotted contour
in Fig. 8 has multiple solutions to q∗1 = p0, i.e., when the last
agent has comparatively smaller than the preceding agent.
This is important as the crossings indicate a change in the
perceived bias of the predecessor and also indicates the regions
in which the last agent overweights the unlikely hypothesis as
in Fig. 7.
VI. TEAM CONSTRUCTION CRITERION
Having studied the mathematical conditions for optimal
reweighting of initial beliefs, we now investigate team se-
lection for social learning. Naturally, a social planner who
is aware of the context p0 can pick the optimal agent pairs
to minimize Bayes risk. However, it is not clear if agents
are capable of organizing themselves into ideal teams in the
absence of contextual knowledge. Thus, we now identify the
criterion for the last agent to identify the optimal predecessors
among a set of given predecessors.
Theorem 7: Consider two predecessors with q1 < q1′ . Let
λ1, λ1′ be the decision thresholds of the respective predeces-
sors. Then, the predecessor with belief q1 is the optimal choice
if and only if
P1
[
Y1 ∈ [λ1, λ1′ ], Y2 ∈ [λ12, λ02]
]
P0 [Y1 ∈ [λ1, λ1′ ], Y2 ∈ [λ12, λ02]]
≥ c10p0
c01(1− p0) . (31)
Proof: Given in App. C.
In other words, by rewriting (31) in a likelihood ratio form,
we observe that the criterion for picking the predecessor with
a smaller belief is given by the likelihood ratio test
L
[
Ĥ1 = Ĥ2 = 1, Ĥ1′ = Ĥ2′ = 0
]
≥ c10p0
c01(1− p0) ,
where Ĥ2′ is the decision made by the last agent following
the decision of the predecessor with belief q1′ .
Thus selecting an ideal predecessor requires a social planner
who is aware of the context p0. Without this, the last agent
selects an predecessor according to his personal belief q2.
That is, the last agent verifies condition (31) by replacing
p0 by q2. Such a choice of predecessor might not always
conform to the optimal choice when the belief of the last
agent deviates significantly from the prior. To illustrate, we
consider the problem of choosing between two predecessors
with beliefs q1(p0) = q∗1(p0) and q1′(p0) = p0. Let q(p0, q2)
be the belief of the optimal predecessor choice for a given
pair (p0, q2). We identify the region of correct selection by
shading, S = {(p0, q2) : q(p0, q2) = q(q2, q2)}.
First, when noise levels are equal, the region in which the
last agent picks the correct preceding agent is shown in Fig. 9a.
We note that the correct region is relatively small and does
not include q∗2 . In particular, the last agent with optimal belief
chooses the wrong predecessor always, whereas a suboptimal
last agent with beliefs in the shaded region picks the correct
one.
On the other hand, when the last agent has smaller noise
than the predecessor, the corresponding region is as shown in
Fig. 9b. Here we note that the last agent with optimal belief
picks the correct preceding agent always.
Thus, we note that knowledge of the mathematically optimal
beliefs does not guarantee selection of the right preceding
agent. Further, we also observe that the diversity of noise levels
may increase the feasibility of selecting the right preceding
agent when the last agent has optimal belief.
We also explore the optimal choice of predecessor for the
given optimal last agent in the absence of knowledge of
the prior probability. From (25), the belief of the optimal
preceding agent, q˜1 chosen by an last agent, in the absence
of context (prior probability p0) satisfies
q˜1
1− q˜1 =
p0
1− p0
P I1e,2 − P I0e,2
P II0e,2 − P II1e,2
. (32)
The last agent’s behavior with belief q∗2 is as shown in Fig.
9c. We note that the preceding agent chosen by the last agent
differs from the optimal choice. Further, it is also evident that
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result.
Fig. 9: Context-unaware team selection.
this choice consequently results in an increased Bayes risk.
Such behavior in team selection highlights the significance of
context and thus a social planner for identifying the right team.
VII. HUMAN-AI COLLABORATION SYSTEMS
In this section, we use mathematical results from previous
sections to study the engineering design problem of construct-
ing human-AI collaborative systems. To do so, we make the
following assumptions from the behavioral sciences: Human
agents perform Bayesian decision-making [42]–[45] and their
perceptions follow the Prelec reweighting function [38]. In
addition, agents experience varying observational noise which
is additive and Gaussian (as it is a common model in human
signal perception [46], [47]). As usual in sequential social
learning setup, all agents make selfish decisions [6], [10].
A. Approximation by Prelec Family
To design human-AI collaborative systems, we first de-
termine whether optimal belief functions from previous sec-
tions are close to human behavior as modeled by cumulative
prospect theory [35], [38].5
We approximate the optimal belief curves q∗n by the Prelec
function and study the resulting increase in the Bayes risk. We
restrict to the Prelec family whose fixed point is identical to
p∗ = c10c01+c10 , and then find best parameters (αn, βn) in the
minimax absolute error sense, i.e.,
(αn, βn) = arg min
α,β:w(p∗;α,β)=p∗
‖q∗n(·)− w(·;α, β)‖∞.
Let the Prelec function approximations be (q1,Pre, q2,Pre).
5Bounded rationality models have been categorized into two main classes—
costly bounded rationality and truly bounded rationality [48]. Costly ra-
tionality considers the emergence of boundedly irrational behavior as op-
timization under some costs of decision-making such as computation and
communication. On the other hand, truly bounded rationality is not based
on an optimization framework. Though not the focus of the present paper,
one might wonder whether people are (approximately) naturally optimal for
social learning. That is, do cumulative prospect-theoretic models emerge from
a costly rationality framework for social learning, since the optimal belief
curves result from limitations in computation (selfish decision-making) and
communication (public signal quantization).
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Fig. 10: Optimal beliefs as compared to Prelec-weighted
beliefs.
The Prelec approximations for the two-agent case are shown
in dotted curves in Fig. 10. When the preceding agent has
smaller noise as in Fig. 10a, the Prelec function approximates
the optimal beliefs well and the Bayes risk does not increase by
much. To evaluate the loss from the approximation, consider
the set of correct beliefs q1 = q2 = p0, that result in a Bayes
risk of R2,corr. The maximal loss in terms of Bayes risk from
using the correct beliefs is maxp0(R2,corr−R2,min) ≈ 0.0039.
On the other hand, the maximal loss from the best Prelec
approximation is ≈ 0.0009. This indicates that the natural cog-
nitive biases of humans (i.e., Prelec reweighting) are effective
for social learning when the preceding agent has smaller noise.
On the other hand, when the last agent has smaller noise
as in Fig. 10b, the Prelec approximation does not accurately
mimic the optimal behavior of agents. Recall that the Prelec
function is always increasing and has only one crossing
with unit slope line in (0, 1). Therefore, the Prelec function
fails to account for all the variations in the optimal belief.
Moreover, while the additional loss of Bayes risk by the Prelec
fitting is ≈ 0.0187, the loss from using the correct beliefs,
p0 = q1 = q2, is ≈ 0.0060. This indicates that even though
the Prelec weighting functions serve as good approximations
with predecessors having less noisy observations, they do not
model the optimal behavior in the case of predecessors having
noisier observations. These results suggest that human agents
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Fig. 11: Models of AI-human collaboration, where a machine
provides input for human judgement or vice versa.
following cumulative prospect theory models [35] yield small
Bayes risk when predecessors have smaller noise.
B. Human-AI Teams
The previous subsection informs the design of AI-human
collaboration structures [34]. In many human-AI joint teams,
a human agent makes the final decision based on the advice
of an AI component as depicted in Fig. 11a, but the opposite
structure of Fig. 11b is also possible. It is thus important to
identify the best team configuration [48]. Indeed, D. Kah-
neman recently stated that “You can combine humans and
machines, provided the machine has the last word” [49].
Our results indicate that an AI assistant with smaller noise
could be an effective predecessor to the human decision-
maker. In particular, an open-minded AI predecessor and a
closed-minded human final decision-maker with appropriate
Prelec reweighted beliefs work well together, as in Fig. 6.
However, an AI component with greater noise might not be
a good predecessor to the human last agent who does not
have beliefs that mimic the optimal behavior in Fig. 7 and so
perhaps counterintuitively, the architecture of Fig. 11b should
be adopted, with the AI agent having larger noise making the
global decision.
Additionally, these results along with those of Sec. VI
provide some insight into human-AI teams when the human
agent picks an AI predecessor, given a choice among different
agents. In particular, consider the AI-human team where the
human, who has a Prelec-weighted belief, chooses one of two
possible AI predecessors—one that has the optimal belief q∗1
and the other that is aware of the true prior p0. In case the
human agent has larger noise, and a closed-minded Prelec
belief as in Fig. 9a, she unfortunately picks the AI predecessor
with q1 = p0 and the team becomes suboptimal. However,
if the human agent has smaller noise, and an open-minded
Prelec belief, she picks the optimal AI component q1 = q∗1
and therefore can make the optimal decision as in Fig. 9b.
Thus it is evident that optimal team organization is feasible
when the human has smaller noise and the appropriate open-
minded belief.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We discussed the sequential social learning problem with
individual biased beliefs. Unlike previous works on herding,
we focused on the Bayes risk of the last-acting agent. We first
derived the optimal belief update rule for general likelihoods
and evaluated for Gaussian likelihoods. Counterintuitively,
optimal beliefs that yield minimum Bayes risk are in general
different from the true prior. Under equal noise levels, we
observed that optimal preceding agents have open-minded
beliefs, that is, overweight small priors and underweight large
priors, while the optimal last agent has closed-minded belief.
However, the trend may change depending on varying noise
levels such that especially when the last agent has much
smaller noise, optimal belief of the last agent is inverted as
she becomes open-minded.
We also showed that the Prelec reweighting function from
cumulative prospect theory approximates the behavior of the
optimal beliefs under specific levels of noise, however, when
the last agent has much smaller noise, it fails to capture all
the behavioral traits of the optimal beliefs.
Finally, we considered the ability of agents to organize
themselves into optimal teams and showed that in the absence
of a social planner, the last agent can get paired with the wrong
predecessor when the individual belief deviates significantly
from the underlying prior value. The setup arises from the
consideration of AI and it tells us without knowing the
true prior, our human-machine team construction could be
misorganized.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Let us prove Thm. 5 starting with the premise that q∗1 ≥ p0.
First, from (25), we have
q∗1 ≥ p0 ⇐⇒
P II1e,2 − P II0e,2
P I1e,2 − P I0e,2
≥ −1. (33)
To study the ratio in (33), consider the Type I vs. Type
II error curve for binary hypothesis testing under additive
Gaussian noise.6 This is shown in Fig. 12, and as seen here
is a convex function [50]. Note that on the curve, the Type I
and Type II error probabilities, (P Ie, P
II
e ), are the points on the
curve that have tangents with slope matching −
(
c10q
c01(1−q)
)
,
where q is the corresponding probability, and σ2 is the variance
of the additive Gaussian noise.
First, from Thm. 2, we know that q02 ≥ q12 which in turn
implies that λ02 ≥ λ12. This in turn indicates that
P I0e,2 = Q
(
λ02
σ2
)
≤ Q
(
λ12
σ2
)
= P I1e,2.
Similarly, P II0e,2 ≥ P II1e,2, and thus, as shown in the figure, the
point B0 =
(
P I0e,2, P
II0
e,2
)
lies to the left of B1 =
(
P I1e,2, P
II1
e,2
)
.
6It is also called Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve [50], [51]
when the curve is vertically inverted.
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Fig. 12: The point B0 always exists between points B1 and
B¯1.
Further, since B1 lies on the curve, so does the point B¯1 =(
P II1e,2, P
I1
e,2
)
as it caters to the error probabilities corresponding
to the probability of the null hypothesis PH = 0 = 1 − q12 .
Thus, the line B1B¯1 has a slope of −1.
Note that the condition (33) translates to the slope of the
line B0B1 is greater than −1. Observe that if B¯1 lies to the
right of B1 then it implies that the slope of B0B1 is less than
−1, violating (33). Similarly, if B0 lies to the left of B¯1, then
again the (33) is violated.
On the other hand, if B0 lies between B¯1 and B1, then we
know that the slope of B0B1 is greater than that of B1B¯1,
therein satisfying (33). Thus, (33) is true if and only if the
point B0 lies between the two points B1 and B¯1.
From the convexity of the curve and comparing coordinates
of B0 and B¯1, we have
q∗1 ≥ p0
⇐⇒ P I0e,2 ≥ P II1e,2 and P II0e,2 ≤ P I1e,2
(a)⇐⇒ Q
(
λ02
σ2
)
≥ 1−Q
(
λ12 − 1
σ2
)
and Q
(
λ12
σ2
)
≥ 1−Q
(
λ02 − 1
σ2
)
(b)⇐⇒ λ02 + λ12 ≤ 1
(c)⇐⇒ 2λ1,[2] + σ22 log
P Ie,1,[2]
(
1− P Ie,1,[2]
)
P IIe,1,[2]
(
1− P IIe,1,[2]
)
 ≤ 1, (34)
where (a) follows from the false alarm and missed detection
probabilities in terms of the Q-function of the standard Gaus-
sian random variable; (b) follows from the fact that the Q-
function is monotonically decreasing and that 1 − Q(x) =
Q(−x); and (c) follows from (22), (23), and λ1,[2] = λ2(q2).
From (28), we have
λ1,[2] =
1
2
+ σ22 log
(
c10q
∗
2
c01(1− q∗2)
)
.
Substituting in (34), we have
q∗1 ≥ p0 ⇐⇒ 2 log
(
c10q
∗
2
c01(1− q∗2)
)
≤ log
P IIe,1,[2]
(
1− P IIe,1,[2]
)
P Ie,1,[2]
(
1− P Ie,1,[2]
)
 .
Letting x := log
(
c10q
∗
2
c01(1−q∗2 )
)
= 1
σ22
(
λ2 − 12
)
and using
Q(·) representation of error probabilities, we have
q∗1 ≥ p0 ⇐⇒ 2x ≤ log
Q
(
σ2x− 12σ2
)
Q
(
−σ2x+ 12σ2
)
Q
(
σ2x+
1
2σ2
)
Q
(
−σ2x− 12σ2
)
 .
(35)
From Cor. 1, we know that the function
g˜(x) = x+ log
(
Q
(
σx+ 12σ
)
Q
(
σx− 12σ
))
is an increasing function of x. Thus, reformulating (35) using
g˜(·),
q∗1 ≥ p0 ⇐⇒ g˜(x) ≤ g˜(−x)
⇐⇒ x ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ q∗2 ≤
c01
c01 + c10
.
The condition for equality follows from observing the condi-
tion for equality at all the inequalities, proving the first part
of the result.
The second part follows directly from the first, taking into
account the trivial cases of p0 ∈ {0, 1}.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
We will consider the case of c01 = c10 = 1 for convenience.
The proof extends directly by a simple scaling argument.
The optimal belief of worker two satisfies ∂R2∂q2 = 0. Thus,
differentiating (24) with respect to q2 and rearranging,
p0
[
(1− P Ie,1)fY2|H(λ02|0)
∂λ02
∂q2
+ P Ie,1fY2|H(λ
1
2|0)
∂λ12
∂q2
]
=
(1− p0)
[
P IIe,1fY2|H(λ
0
2|1)
∂λ02
∂q2
+ (1− P IIe,1)fY2|H(λ12|1)
∂λ12
∂q2
]
.
Let x = log
(
p0
1−p0
)
. For q∗2 = 1/2 and q
∗
1 = p0, we have
λ1 =
1
2
+ σ21x and λ1,[2] =
1
2
.
It implies P Ie,1,[2] = P
II
e,1,[2] = Q(1/2σ2). Then,
L(λ02) =
fY2|H(λ
0
2|1)
fY2|H(λ
0
2|0)
=
q2
1− q2
(1− P Ie,1,[2])
P IIe,1,[2]
=
Q(−1/2σ2)
Q(1/2σ2)
=:
1
c
,
L(λ12) =
fY2|H(λ
1
2|1)
fY2|H(λ
1
2|0)
=
q2
1− q2
P Ie,1,[2]
(1− P IIe,1,[2])
=
Q(1/2σ2)
Q(−1/2σ2) = c.
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Equivalently, this implies that
λ02 =
1
2
+ σ2 log
(
1
c
)
, λ12 =
1
2
− σ2 log
(
1
c
)
.
Thus, λ02 + λ
1
2 = 1, and so,
fY2|H(λ
1
2|1) =
1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (λ12−1)2
2σ22
)
=
1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (λ02)2
2σ22
)
= fY2|H(λ
0
2|0).
Similarly, we also have
fY2|H(λ
1
2|0) = fY2|H(λ02|1).
Further, from (22) and (23), we have
dλ02
dq2
=
dλ02
dλ1,[2]
dλ1,[2]
dq2
=
1 + σ22φ
(
λ1,[2]
σ2
)
1− P Ie,1,[2]
−
σ22φ
(
λ1,[2]−1
σ2
)
P IIe,1,[2]
 dλ1,[2]
dq2
,
dλ12
dq2
=
dλ12
dλ1,[2]
dλ1,[2]
dq2
=
1− σ22φ
(
λ1,[2]
σ2
)
P Ie,1,[2]
+
σ22φ
(
λ1,[2]−1
σ2
)
1− P IIe,1,[2]
 dλ1,[2]
dq2
.
When, λ1,[2] = 12 , P
I
e,1,[2] = P
II
e,1,[2] = Q
(
1
2σ2
)
, and
φ
(
λ1,[2]
σ2
)
= φ
(
λ1,[2]−1
σ2
)
. Thus, dλ
0
2
dq2
=
dλ12
dq2
.
Using these, the values of prior for which q∗1 = p0, q
∗
2 = 1/2
are given by
p0
1− p0 =
Q
(
−1
2σ2
)
Q
(
−1
2σ1
− σ1x
)
+Q
(
1
2σ2
)
Q
(
1
2σ1
+ σ1x
)
Q
(
−1
2σ2
)
Q
(
−1
2σ2
+ σ1x
)
+Q
(
1
2σ2
)
Q
(
1
2σ1
− σ1x
) .
(36)
Using the definitions of x, α, β in (36), and the fact that
Q(−y) = 1−Q(y), the result follows.
APPENDIX C
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From (1), we note that the Bayes risk for social learning
with beliefs (q1, q2) is
R2(q1, q2) = c10p0
[
P I0e,2(1− P Ie,1) + P I1e,2P Ie,1
]
+ c01(1− p0)
[
P II0e,2P
II
e,1 + P
II1
e,2(1− P IIe,1)
]
.
Then, the difference in Bayes risk between the two choices of
advisors is given by
∆R2 = R2(q1, q2)−R2(q1′ , q2)
= c10p0(P
I
e,1 − P Ie,1′)(P I1e,2 − P I0e,2)
+ c01(1− p0)(P IIe,1 − P IIe,1′)(P II0e,2 − P II1e,2). (37)
Since q1 < q1′ , the decision thresholds satisfy λ1 < λ1′ .
Thus, from (37) and independence of Y1, Y2 given H , we see
that ∆R2 ≤ 0 if and only if (31) holds.
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